P H I L O S O P H Y P A T H W A Y S ISSN 2043-0728
Issue number 33
2nd June 2002
I. 'God or Nature: The Evolutionist-Creationist Controversy' by
II. 'El Miedo a la Muerte' by Carlos Evia Rosado
III. The Pathways Online Conference - Three Months On
I. 'GOD OR NATURE: THE EVOLUTIONIST-CREATIONIST CONTROVERSY' BY D.R. KHASHABA
The battle raging between creationists and evolutionists is probably the one
that raises the greatest hubbub on the intellectual front at present. Though,
as will presently appear, I do not regard this as a properly philosophical
issue, still I think there is call for philosophers to clear some of the
confusions and misuderstandings that envelop the battleground.
I maintain that philosophy, exercising pure reason, cannot give us knowledge
about the objective world. Socrates, the first thinker to realize this clearly,
decisively renounced all investigation into 'physis'. He was concerned solely
with the ideas and ideals that constitute our specifically human life.
Subsequent philosophers, beginning with Plato, in various degrees obscured or
lost sight of this great Socratic insight, and in consequence embroiled
philosophy in many needless difficulties and controversies. (Among moderns it
was Kant, in his critical philosophy, who revived the Socratic insight, with
some complications, but his successors again lost it with a vengeance.) That's
why I say that the evolutionist-creationist controversy is not properly a
Again I say that the advocates of religion are ill-advised to be drawn into the
controversy. Creationism is a theory relating to the objective world and as such
it is a scientific theory -- good or bad, reconcilable or irreconcilable with
other theories: these are questions to be resolved by the methods of science,
and what might be regarded as established truth today may be reversed tomorrow,
and in no case will that have any bearing on questions of value. For let us
grant the creationists that we could prove by impeccable scientific methods
that the world was created by a personal god. Here is a theory, as bad and as
good as any other: Before the Big Bang there was another universe (why not?)
that had culminated in the evolution (let's have the best of both worlds) of an
all-powerful god. That god programmed a terramicro chip to produce the Big Bang
and all that followed it up to the scribbling of these words of mine. (I know
this is not only nonsense but bad nonsense to boot; someone more clever than I
am can surely produce a more plausible version.) Suppose this theory were
established by rigorous scientific methods as true. Must I then adore, honour
or admire that god? No; I would cry in his face, Damn you for all the evil and
all the suffering you have put into your scheme of things. I would accept the
facts as facts but that would have no bearing on my ideals and values.
Yet there is no comfort here for the scientific camp. For just as the empirical
vindication of the personal god would not give him any claim on my respect, so
the discovery of the minutest details of the process by which the world has
come to be would give us no understanding of that world, whether brought about
by a personal fiat or an impersonal evolution. But here we have to stop for a
lexical digression. The words 'knowledge' and 'understanding' are very
troublesome. They both refer to two radically different things, two totally
different realms of our mental life; let us call them the objective and the
subjective. The ideal solution would be to appropriate one of the terms to each
of the two distinct realms. Sounds simple. The trouble is: (1) there is no
consensus and there has never been; (2) more seriously, enthusiasts for the
objective kind simply deny the existence of the other kind and lay claim to
both terms. So that when we ask, Does the genome project give us knowledge of a
human being?, they answer, Yes; and when we ask, Does it give us understanding
of a human being?, again they answer, Yes. I would say that the genome project
gives us the knowledge that (hopefully) may enable us to cure or prevent
diseases, to resolve forensic mysteries, perhaps to reproduce Hitlers, Pol
Pots, and Ariel Sharons at will, but it does not give us the insight necessary
to put an end to the evil of such monsters. Now take whichever word you like
for the one kind and leave me the other word for the other kind. (See my
"Knowledge and Understanding" on www.Back-to-Socrates.com )
When Richard Dawkins is challenged by creationists to "give an example of a
genetic mutation or an evolutionary process which can be seen to increase the
information in the genome" he writes a full-length article about 'information'
as technically defined by the American engineer Claude Shannon in 1948. ("The
Information Challenge" by Richard Dawkins,
http://www.skeptics.com.au/journal/dawkins1.htm ) That technical definition is
no doubt a very good and very fruitful definition when it is used for what it
was devised for. But is it the only possible definition of the term? Does it
give the only valid meaning of the term? In fact, in line with all scientific
thinking, it is averse to all meaning and meaningfulness. It seizes on an
extraneous feature of the object of inquiry, symbolizes it, quantifies it,
drains it of all life and all meaning, and lives happily with its parched
shell. I am not here to defend the imbecilities of 'creationism', but if the
creationists' challenge meant to affirm that no description of any genetic
mutation or evolutionary process can give us an understanding of, say, vision
or consciousness, I would say that Dawkins has failed to meet the challenge. If
there were no intelligence and creativity (as distinct from personal creation)
at the heart of nature, then I cannot see how the mere putting together of bits
and bytes -- even DNA bits and bytes -- could produce our feelings and thoughts.
In other words, it is right that evolutionists should have our attentive and
respectful ear when they describe, step by step, how consciousness came about,
but when they tell us that is all there is to consciousness, we must object to
a reductionism that bars our intelligence from looking into an entire realm of
But while I would thus agree with, say, Stephen Jay Gould that science should
limit itself to studying the natural world, I would not agree with him in
relegating the study of meanings and values to religion. If asked, Why not?, I
would pose two questions in response: (1) Shall we accept the dogmatic dictates
of religion on trust, putting our reason to sleep? (2) What about the
conflicting claims of different religions? I hold that our worth as human
beings resides in our reason and spirituality. So while, in opposition to
religion, I maintain that it would undermine our dignity to accept anything as
lying outside the jurisdiction of reason, in opposition to scienticism, I
maintain that our proper worth as human beings resides in the ideas, ideals and
dreams that are creations of the mind and that cannot be reduced to the
givennesses of the phenomenal world. It is only in a philosophy that jealously
guards its independence of science that we can find the combination of reason
and spirituality that is necessary for a whole human life.
All attempts at reconciling science and religion or science and philosophy are
equally misguided, though for different reasons. Philosophy is not equipped to
deal with facts and science is not equipped to deal with meanings and values.
(I resist a temptation to digress on a discussion of social sciences and
psychology.) But religion cannot avoid making factual claims. To attempt any
reconciliation with science means submitting itself to the jurisdiction of
scientific methods and scientific criteria, and that will always be damaging to
the dogmatic claims of religion. The best policy for adherents of religion would
be to maintain that their revealed truths are not amenable to scrutiny, which
amounts to a deliberate choice of stupidity. All apologetics are doubly stupid
because while committed in principle to mindlessness they venture on a contest
that can only be fought with the weapons of intelligence.
Finally, the creationist-evolutionist dispute amounts to the question: Do we
have to thank God or Nature for what we are?, and in arbitrating between the
two parties philosophy should declare that as long as the question is posed in
that form, we can never arrive at a satisfactory answer. It is only Spinoza's
unified God-or-Nature that can account for the whole that we are. And of that
whole, science is concerned with the natural dimension, philosophy with the
divine dimension -- or, to resort once again to Spinoza's language, science has
to do with 'natura naturata' and philosophy with 'natura naturans'.
(c) D.R. Khashaba 2002
Web site: www.Back-to-Socrates.com
II. 'EL MIEDO A LA MUERTE' BY CARLOS EVIA ROSADO
6th May 2002
Dear Dr Klempner,
Please find enclosed my essay on the fear of death, which finally came out of
the printing house. I am sorry that it is in Spanish, but I wanted to share my
philosophical knowledge (even if scarce) with my family, friends and
acquaintances. Nevertheless, I will try to make a brief summary for you.
The title of the essay reads: "The Fear of Death. A Philosophical Enquiry".
With this title I try to mean that it is not my philosophy (although it
contains some experiences and thoughts of my own) but rather a survey of the
thoughts of philosophers on that subject. Nevertheless, the analysis and
conclusions are mine.
The painting on the cover, Rembrandt's "The Anatomy Lesson" intends to depict
the naturalistic approach of the essay, as opposed to the theist approach of
The dedication reads: "Dedicated to Dr Geoffrey Klempner, Director of Studies,
The Philosophical Society of England, for his efforts to put Philosophy to the
reach of all".
The Preface describes my motivations for writing this essay, that go back to my
working under your supervision in the Pathways to Philosophy programme. This
work uncovered the fear of death that had been a permanent companion to me
since I suffered a heart attack in 1992, after my undergoing other death
threats which I recall.
The Introduction: "To be or not to be. That is the question... .".
Chapter I (Life and Death) tries to define both the concepts of life and death.
Regarding the latter, besides its physical characteristics I describe some
Chapter 11 (After Death) describes and criticises the following views of the
afterlife: 1) The Orthodox Jewish (death as a punishment); 2) The
Platonic-Christian (Immortality and resurrection); 3) The Epicurean (secular
death); 4) The Stoic (creative resignation), and The Oriental (reincarnation).
My conclusion is that all these views have in common that they are product of
the imagination of human beings. The sheer fact is that we do not know what
happens after death.
Chapter 111 (The Problem of the Soul) points out that, despite the importance
of the Soul/ Body philosophical problem, it is not dealt here except for what
relates to religious views of death. Therefore, it contains a brief history of
the soul concept followed by a criticsm of the religious concept of the soul.
In particular, I try to refute substance, spirituality and immortality as
properties of the soul. To that end I rely mainly on the works of Hume,
although other authors are quoted.
Chapter IV (The Fear of Death) is of a psychological character. It tries to
answer the question: Why do we fear death? At the beginning of the Chapter I
describe some personal experiences and then I rely mainly in the works of
Ernest Becker and other psychologists to conclude that fear of death is both
innate and enforced by the environment.
Chapter V (Is It Rational to Fear Death?) is very close to the last unit of
"The Possible World Machine". I try to make a distinction between rational and
irrational fears and rational and irrational persons. Then I use a model
developed by Jeffrie Murphy for a rational person to fear a certain state of
affairs to prove that "other worldly" views of death are irrational, whereas
naturalistic views are rational. I reinforce this argument with a survey of
different philosophers views regarding the rationality of the fear of death. I
conclude that Philosophy teaches us that it is irrational to fear death per se,
to fear the fact that someday we will cease to exist.
Chapter VI (Strategies for Living) reviews several strategies that could be
used to overcome the fear of death and to get the greatest profit from life.
Finally, I make a review of my own strategies and how they have changed along
Let me tell you that I enjoyed very much all the stages in the preparation of
this essay (except for the my struggle with the printing house). Again, thank
you very much for giving me this wonderful opportunity.
A reproduction of the front cover of Carlos Evia Rosado's book 'El Miedo a la
Muerte' together with the Dedication and first paragraph of the Preface in the
original Spanish can be found on the Pathways web site at:
III. THE PATHWAYS ONLINE CONFERENCE - SIX MONTHS ON
Since January, there have been over 350 postings on Pathways conference on the
'Use and Value of Philosophy', exceeding all our expectations. The quality of
the discussion has been excellent. Well done to all those involved!
Rather than relaunch the conference, we have decided to allow new participants
to join at any time.
In a previous issue (20) of 'Philosophy Pathways' I wrote: "What is an internet
conference? It is simply a way for people anywhere in the world to express their
ideas, exchange views and dialogue with others who have similar interests. You
write something and post it on the conference, just as if you were sending an
e-mail. Others respond to what you have written and so the discussion proceeds."
For those who are new to this idea, have a look at issue 1 of the Pathways
newsletter, which is posted at:
The conference uses the 'First Class' software which can be downloaded free
The First Class client is very easy to use. On the desktop there are help files
and a 'Practice' conference which you can use to test out different features of
the program. However, if you prefer, you can also access and post messages to
the conference using a standard web browser, such as Netscape or Internet
To be eligible to participate in the Conference you must be a member of the
International Society for Philosophers OR the Philosophical Society of England.
If you would like to participate, e-mail me at email@example.com and I
will forward your name to Dr Martin Gough, who will issue you with your
personal username and password.
If you are not already a member of the International Society for Philosophers,
you can join by submitting the blue form at
If you would like to observe the conference only, go to
http://clsconf.ioe.ac.uk/Login/ and login as:
Charley Countryman, one of the conference participants writes:
"In an exchange of mail about topics, I had written to Rachel Browne [another
conference participant] that Socrates should not be limited to his current
reincarnation as a columnist at 'Philosophy Now'. (Though he probably helps
that colorful philosophical magazine pay its rent. Something Socrates' friend
Crito would have appreciated.)
"Rachel wrote back: 'Socrates continued to ask questions even though he didn't
expect those he asked to know. He wanted them to think. He didn't expect those
he engaged in conversation to answer the questions he asked about virtue and
ethics, but he wanted relevant points to arise within discussion...Questioning
wasn't a way to destroy understanding, but a means of deepening it. If we don't
question ethics and virtue, we are not thinking about it. If we think about it,
and question it, we are trying to get in touch with the subject even if there
is no definitive outcome.'
"I had also written: you can substitute your name for Meno's name in the
Socratic dialogue recorded by Plato as MENO and be asked what is virtue.
"Socrates could say: 'Please just tell me yourself, what, in heavens name, you
say virtue is. Speak out, and don't begrudge me an answer. If you...turn out to
have this knowledge, that will show up my remark, that I have never met anyone
who did know what virtue is, as a mistake on my part -- as lucky a mistake as I
could possibly hope to make. (Loosely borrowed from T.D.J. Chappell's
translation of Plato: 'The Plato Reader', Edinburgh University Press,1996.)
"So before coming to any conclusions about the end of philosophy, perhaps we
should go back to Socrates and see what he has to ask us today. Maybe some of
you observers have some suggestions about which passages of Socrates we could
[From Charley Countryman 24 May 2002]
If I may add a couple of postscripts to Charley's note:
If we are talking about the 'value of philosophy', we can ask, 'What is Value?'
(or the related, but distinct, question 'What is Virtue?') and also 'What is
Philosophy?' Taken together, the questions of value, philosophy and the value
of philosophy cover a pretty wide area - enough to keep the conference busy for
some time to come.
Coincidentally, Dr Daoud Rofail Khashaba, who has contributed the article for
this issue has a web site, www.Back-to-Socrates.com which is well worth a visit.
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