Schopenhauer: "The World as Will" as Theology
"The Absolute is its appearances; it really is." ... Bradley
"And look at everyone — it's in them all" ["Und sieh dir andre an: es ist in allen"] ... Rilke
It is interesting to view Schopenhauer's teaching of the world as Wille as a theology. In this light Schopenhauer can be considered an 'atheist' only from a narrow perspective.* Schopenhauer's theology, as a Western monist/monotheist view based on Eastern thought, offers an alternative both to atheism and to Western/Middle Eastern monotheism (Judaism, Christianity, Islam).
[* Other alleged 'atheists' included Socrates, Spinoza, and the early Christians themselves. Often cited as an atheist, Shelley points out on his opening page that he has no objection to theism per se, but only as it appears in Judeo-Christianity.]
The approach will be to characterize Schopenhauer's thought concerning Wille, to identify key Western and Eastern conceptions of God, and then to see where Wille fits, and does not fit, these conceptions.
A. What is Wille?
"Not as a god, but as a god might be" ... Stevens
Schopenhauer's Wille is essentially Kant's noumenon, but with Kant's intentions subverted. Whereas Kant wanted to set aside the noumenon from the grasp of 'pure reason' so that the observer (and science) could concentrate on phenomena (governed by space, time, and causality), Schopenhauer re-introduced the noumenon as at least partially graspable, in both its external and essential aspects, by reason and introspection.
Wille is the essential nature of the universe ungoverned by appearances, that is, underlying phenomena which are governed by space, time, and causality (the principles of sufficient reason). A fascinating dynamic in Schopenhauer's philosophy is the interplay between Wille as incomprehensible, 'blind', and goal-less, and Wille as knowable, knowing, and having a clear goal that is in the process of being reached through the evolution of intelligent life. As Janaway complains, "If the thing in itself is supposed to be unknowable, how can Schopenhauer claim to know what it is?" (Janaway 1999c)
Both Kant and Schopenhauer are quite clear on the noumenon's being not something outside the universe, but to be the appearances, sub specie aeternitatis. The noumenon is its appearances, not a force 'behind' appearances, pulling the strings.
"[Wille] is that of which all representation, all object, is the phenomenon, the visibility, the objectivity. It is the innermost essence, the kernel, of every particular thing and also of the whole. It appears in every blindly acting force of nature, and also in the deliberate conduct of man." (Schopenhauer vol.1, p.110)
"Ultimately, there is only one thing. This brain of mine and my eyeballs are physical components of a material object, my body, which is all, including them, self-objectification of will. But like everything there is for them to perceive is also self-objectification of will. 'At bottom it is one entity that perceives itself and is perceived by itself.'" (Magee 1997, p.160f, quoting Schopenhauer vol.2, p.18)
The world is one thing (one energy or force), not many things; and this thing must be uncreated (no cause), unbounded (no space), and eternal (no time). It follows that human beings are all parts of the noumenon, one animal — the same animal * that Wille is. We are all, jointly and severally, Wille; we are objectifications of Wille subject to the principle of sufficient reason. To us, Wille appears as will to life; to science, energy; to itself — we will see.
[* 'Animal' is precise: Wille's principle of movement and change lies within itself, not in any outside force (there is no outside force).]
[Additional citations for section A: Schopenhauer, vol.1, p.129, 153; vol.2, p.325; Atwell 1995, p.109, 111, 115, 126; Gillespie 1995, p. 186; Janaway 1999c; Magee 1997, p.144]
B. How and what can we know about Wille?
"The will proclaims itself first of all in the voluntary movements of the body." (Schopenhauer)
Schopenhauer views our bodies as the key to the mystery of Wille: we experience our bodies as objective things, and also as subjects, 'from inside'. The experience of being a self clearly bothered and inspired Schopenhauer. We are both objectively existing beings (just as other people are), and yet we are also the subjective center of the universe. Through our bodies we can see into (or at least partway into) the mysteries of both phenomena and noumena: The self in its two aspects is the key to knowledge of the world as being two kinds of things, ultimately reducible to one thing.
"Human beings have the unique ability to view the world in a detached way. At the same time, each of us is a particular person, each with a 'personal' view of the world. How do we reconcile these two standpoints?" (Nagel 1986, abridged)
"To the subject of knowing, who appears as an individual only through his identity with the body, this body is given in two entirely different ways. It is given in intelligent perception as representation as an object among objects, liable to the laws of these objects. But is also given in quite a different way, namely as what is known immediately to everyone, and is denoted by the word will." (Schopenhauer, vol.1, p.100)
Now, what can we know about Wille other than its bare existence as thing-in-itself? Quite a bit, according to Schopenhauer. Wille is experienced by us as 'will to life' — to survive and reproduce. We do not know if this is the essential aspect of Wille, merely how Wille is experienced by us. Schopenhauer finds the will to life not only in people and other animals, but in plants and rocks.
"Spinoza says that if a stone projected through the air had consciousness, it would imagine it was flying of its own will. I add merely that the stone would be right." (Schopenhauer, vol.1, p.126)
[Additional citations for section B: Schopenhauer, vol.1, p.106, p.125, p.162; vol.2, p.195; Atwell 1995, p.112; Gillespie, p.186]
C. What can be meant by Wille's 'blind' 'striving'?
If we can know something about the 'unknowable' Wille, what can Wille know about itself? Wille is never satisfied; this frustration dooms Wille (including ourselves) to never reaching fulfillment. Further, this 'blind' striving is striving for nothing, or the possibility would exist that the striving might reach its goal. Life is not a goal, only our experience of this blindness.
"Absence of all aim, of all limits, belongs to the essential nature of the will in itself, which is an endless striving. .... It ... reveals itself in the simplest form of the lowest grade of the will's objectivity, namely gravitation, the constant striving of which we see, although a final goal for it is obviously impossible." (Schopenhauer vol.1, p.164)
But hasn't Schopenhauer set out an impossible criterion here? If gravity can be spoken of as having a 'final goal', what could that be, other than what gravity in fact does?
"The will always knows, when knowledge enlightens it, what it wills here and now, but never what it wills in general. Every individual act has a purpose or end; willing as a whole has no end in view." (Schopenhauer vol.1, p.164f)
We have our individual or social goals, but what 'as a whole' is our goal 'in general'? Again, Schopenhauer has set the bar too high. In fact, Schopenhauer has found a goal for Wille, and none for us — our individual goals are illusory: we do what we, but only as objectifications of Wille, want to do, like Spinoza's stone's flying through the air of its own 'free' will.
"Because the thing in itself is will, because, that is, there is only blind will to life, there can be no real or objective purpose in the world." (Berman 1998, p.180)
But, just as in the story about gravity, this seems to be quite arbitrary. Wille is not completely blind, or completely goal-less. It seeks self-knowledge through 'levels of objectification', an infinite hierarchical series beginning with inanimate matter, to plants, other animals, and finally to mankind. It seeks to see like a man stumbling in the darkness. Wille has hit upon a way to gain knowledge of its own nature, through us.
Schopenhauer oscillates between saying that Wille knows (something), and does not know (anything).
"The mirror of the will has appeared to it in the world as representation. In this mirror the will knows itself in increasing degrees of distinctness and completeness, the highest of which is man." (Schopenhauer vol.1, p.275)
"With me it is the will-without-knowledge that is the foundation of the reality of things". (Schopenhauer vol.2, p.269)
"The will as the thing-in-itself, constitutes the inner, true, and indestructible nature of man; yet in itself it is without consciousness." (Schopenhauer vol.2, p.201)
"The sole self-knowledge of the will as a whole is the representation as a whole, the whole world of perception." (Schopenhauer vol.1, p.165)
Perhaps this fourth quotation presents Schopenhauer's resolution to the conundrum of self-knowledge. As increasing self-knowledge is obtained, Wille realizes its pointlessness (because we, as the knowing objectification, realize its pointlessness), but what could qualify, in Schopenhauer, as failure to have a goal or to arrive at a goal, if self-knowledge is the goal? And if we have now arrived at some level of self knowledge in the philosophy of Schopenhauer, isn't that enough?
[Additional citations for section C: Schopenhauer vol.1, p.128, 145, 155, 164; vol.2, p.259; Loiskandl et al 1986; Magee 1997, p.139, 147, 161; Simmel 1907, p.45] ,
D. In what way are things 'evil'? What support for pessimism?
So, Wille is not so 'blind' after all -- it has so far been successful in beginning to attain its goal, self-knowledge. Now, what does this self-knowledge know? Among other in-sights, that the world is a wretched place.
"He was possessed by the idea that there is something inherently evil, monstrous, wicked about the ultimate force that constitutes the world." (Magee 1997, p.146)
But how is this shown? By the 'war of all against all'? But why is Schopenhauer so insistent on this being a calamity, rather than just being the way the world is, or even celebrating this struggle of energy, as in Nietzsche or Blake? The passage where Schopenhauer moves from his concept of the world as Wille to his value judgement of it seems to me to be weak, and susceptible to more than one conclusion. Perhaps he sought theoretical support for his ethical teachings of renunciation and compassion which he had already decided on.
It is a characteristic of a theology that it is associated with an ethic *; Schopenhauer's is no exception. Strongly influenced by Buddhism, Schopenhauer presents an ethic of Mitleid ('suffering-with', or just as literally, 'com-passion', sometimes mistranslated 'pity'.) The objectifications of Wille, each being driven by will to life, are inevitably in a deadly struggle one with another, with ourselves, since we are all one. (Magee 1998, p.397) Therefore Wille struggles against itself, an unending futile tragedy, and it were better if we had never existed.
]* This is not logical implication, but constant conjunction. "If there is no God, then all things are permitted."]
"Will to life goes with will to power. To exist is to be unjust, since it is impossible not to encroach on the will of another." (Berman 1995)
However, the conclusion is not inescapable.
"Nietzsche objects to Schopenhauer's contention that seeing a single will as the fundamental reality should lead one to a stance of Mitleid." (Higgins 1998, p.166)
I view Schopenhauer's turn to pessimism and Mitleid to be a theological turn, based on faith, not directly derivable from viewing the world as Wille. The world as Wille can just as easily generate love of power, love of struggle (win or lose), use of dissatisfaction to generate strength in overcoming, celebration of our Hobbsian situation, not because it is 'evil' or 'good' — but just because it is the way it is.
We will see that Schopenhauer's views have traditionally condemned him to atheism. But what if the world is what Schopenhauer says it is? Even if Wille is 'evil' (which doesn't follow), an evil god is not a contradiction, or an incoherent concept, or even so strange an idea, given the existence of dualistic religions such as Zoroastrianism, not to mention the being Descartes politely called the Evil 'Demon'.
[Additional citations for section D: Schopenhauer vol.1, p.154; Berman 1998, p.183; Higgins 1998, p.156; Loiskandl et al 1986; Magee 1998, p.397; Simmel 1907, p.52]
E. What is theology? How is Wille like a god?
With this discussion as background, we can now ask, "What is theology?", or, what characteristics have traditionally been assigned to a god, and which of these does Wille share, and not share?
According to the papers in Quinn & Taliaferro's (1997) thorough survey, Western (especially Christian) theologians have held many of the following positions concerning a deity. A deity is, or might be, or must be,
.. Worthy of awe, respect, and submission
.. Immutable: does not change (Creel 1997; Taliaferro 1997)
.. Impassible: insusceptible to cause (Creel 1997)
.. First cause; "Primary operative cause of everything" (Helm 1997)
.. Free: not itself affected by cause (Helm 1997); has free will (Stump 1997)
.. Active sustainer of the universe at every moment through its Providence (McCann 1997)
.. Omnipresent in both space and time (Wierenga 1997, citing Anselm)
.. Incorporeal and not located in space (Tracy 1997, Taliaferro 1997)
.. Immaterial, non-physical (Taliaferro 1997)
.. Eternal and not locatable in time (Tracy 1997, Leftow 1997)
.. One (there is no other god than God)
.. Necessarily exists (Taliaferro 1997, Mann 1997, Hoffman & Rosenkrantz 1997)
.. Eternal rather than temporal (Taliaferro 1997, Stump 1997)
.. Omnipotent (Taliaferro, Hoffman & Rosenkrantz 1997)
.. Simple: has no parts (Taliaferro 1997, Stump 1997)
.. Is Being: God's essence is existence (Taliaferro 1997, Helm 1997, Williams 1997 (citing Aquinas))
.. Omniscient (Hoffman & Rosenkrantz 1997).
.. Creator of the universe (McCann 1997) and hence separate from its creation ("Not everything that exists is God": Taliaferro 1997)
.. Perfectly good; the summum bonum (Taliaferro 1997, Helm 1997)
.. Has a plan for the universe (including the salvation of mankind)
.. Agent of intentional actions; a person (Tracy 1997)
.. Rewarder of virtue; punisher of vice; guarantor of ethics (Helm 1997)
.. Worthy of whole-hearted worship (Mavrodes 1997)
.. Omnibenevolent (Hoffman & Rosenkrantz 1997)
Not all theologians would agree with all these characteristics, and indeed some theologians consider some of these to contradict others; but the general pattern is clear. And all would say that God goes beyond their theorizing and that therefore ultimately it is faith, not reason, that must be the ultimate guarantor of God's importance in our lives (Anselm: "Faith in search of understanding").
In some respects, Wille is similar to other gods:
"Schopenhauer's will is like the God of theism in being a metaphysical principle that underpins and explains the world. It is also like God in having attributes like infinity, omnipotence, eternity." (Berman 1998, p.182)
"In Schopenhauer's view, it is quite clear that what the profoundest of the mystics meant by 'God' was the noumenal, which they were struggling to understand with a conceptual equipment less adequate than his philosophy provides." (Magee 1997, p.224)
Of the listed characteristics, the first 16 might passably characterize Wille, but the last eight clearly distinguish Wille from traditional Western gods:
Separate from its creation
Western religions have held that a god or at least a demiurge created the world, and that the world is radically separate from that god *.
[* A continuing thread of minority opinion from mystics of the three major Western religions holds that God is somehow in everything, not really separate from everything (Boehme, Eckhart, et al). But even that, as 'omnipresence', can be allowed (somewhat uncomfortably) by orthodox theologians — everything but a thoroughgoing pantheism.]
"For Schopenhauer and Spinoza the relationship between God and the world is more like (Neoplatonic) emanation." (Berman 1998, p.182)
Schopenhauer dismissed the concept that,
"The thing in itself is 'the eternal, non-originating, and non-ceasing original being.' That would be the thing in itself?! — I'll tell you what that is: that is the well-known Absolute, thus the disguised cosmological proof on which the Jewish God rides." (Atwell 1995, p114-15, quoting Schopenhauer, letter to Frauenstadt)
Isn't Wille 'eternal, non-originating, and non-ceasing'? The difference is that the 'Jewish God' created the universe, and is separate from it. In Schopenhauer, everything there is, is an objectification or emanation of Wille. The material world "is Wille" — under the sign of sufficient reason.
It is problematical what 'goodness' could mean in relation to a god. (Does God know what is good, or define the good?) In any case, Wille cannot be good if the world (which is Wille) is evil.
Has a plan for man
The 'Jewish god' (who reappears in the gospels) has a plan for mankind's salvation, e.g., mankind's assimilation into the divine kingdom. Wille has according to Schopenhauer no plan. Has it come upon the goal of self-knowledge by accident? Or, did the self-knowledge of Wille 'just happen'?
Agent of intentional actions; a person
Wille acts without consciousness, according to Schopenhauer, therefore without intentionality. Wille is not a 'person'. Wille does not have intentional actions vis-ˆ-vis the world, for Wille is the world. Schopenhauer condemned "The 'Jewish' doctrine that ... 'the world has its existence from a supremely eminent personal being.'" (Janaway 1999d, citing Schopenhauer, vol.1, p.192)
"Our conception of personality, [Schopenhauer] argued, was derived form embodied human beings existing in space and time, with the consequence that no sense could be attached to the ascription of personality to a non-material entity outside space and time." (Magee 1998, p.384)
Rewarder of virtue; punisher of vice
Wille does not reward or punish.
Worthy of worship.
Worship is as irrelevant to Wille as it is to the force that disperses the galaxies, which it is. Just perhaps, even if there is an almighty Yahweh, worship is ultimately just as irrelevant to that being also.
Wille does not have intentions; and so it can be neither benevolent nor evil. To us, the universe of Wille is evil; but to itself, Wille simply is.
Janaway (1999c) remarks that "Will is a general principle of striving or being directed towards ends, but it does not presuppose the rationality associated traditionally with the human (and the divine) will."
If will is 'directed towards ends' isn't that a sign of rationality? But in any case Schopenhauer does not claim that Wille is rational.
Therefore, Wille resembles the Western monotheist god in some ways, and differs in others. Now considering Eastern religions, we find an interesting dichotomy: The Hindu Brahm resembles Wille in being the not-directly-experiencable underlying world-energy. Even though Buddhism is monist in outlook, it has no god as such. If there is a Brahm, it is hidden into or behind reality so thoroughly that traditional Buddhism has discouraged theological speculation. Therefore, Buddhism is of no use to Schopenhauer's teaching of the World as Wille. But in ethics, Schopenhauer advocates Buddhist practices of renunciation, and emptying of the mind to grasp reality (e.g., by listening to music *). Some schools of Hinduism have something of this flavor, but characteristically these developed in response to the Buddhist challenge. Of the three pillars of Buddhism (Buddha, Sangha, Dharma) Schopenhauer concentrates on Dharma (teaching) rather than on the teacher (Buddha), and quite ignores Sangha (the community of believers).
[* This writer would nominate Edmund Rubbra's first symphony as a near approach to the dynamic of Wille.]
Schopenhauer's metaphysics is in origin speculative, and derived from both Eastern and Western religious teachings as well as on the philosophical tradition reaching from British empiricism through Kant. At critical moments it is based on intuition rather than reason. It generates a teaching that can be held fervently and by faith, in part because no conceivable evidence could be brought against it. I conclude that it is therefore in critical respects a theology bonded onto Kantian teaching, because Kant set aside ultimate reality and Schopenhauer could not be satisfied until he discovered (or invented) it.
How is Schopenhauer's Wille like/unlike a God? This: that it goes beyond claims of science and rational knowledge, and beyond 'common sense', and insists, finally, on a kind of faith to know what the world is, rather than a kind of reasoning. Further, it is another leap of faith to go from the is of Wille, to the ethical stance of Mitleid.
Additionally, Schopenhauer sometimes himself goes beyond reason to a 'mystical' point of view:
"The thing in itself, which we know most immediately in the will, may have, entirely outside all possible appearance, determinations, qualities, and modes of existence which for us are absolutely unknowable and incomprehensible, and which then remain as the inner nature of the thing in itself." (Schopenhauer, vol.2, p.198)
"... in his later writings there are passages which suggest that the thing-in-itself is will in only one of its aspects, and that it has other aspects that are the focus of mystical awareness." (Nicholls 1999)
[Additional citations for section E: Nicholls 1999]
Appendix A. What can it mean to call Schopenhauer an 'atheist'?
Berman (1995) holds that "Certainly Schopenhauer's philosophy is atheistic, if by God is meant a good and wise creator of the world." But a supreme being need not be good, nor wise, nor a creator separate from his creation.
"does not openly deny the existence of God, ... what underlies the world is not a wise and good God, but a non-rational and amoral being or force — a blind, violent, insatiable will to life. Hence Schopenhauer's voluntaristic metaphysics precludes theism and implies atheism. If it is true, then theistic religions such as Christianity or Islam must be false." (Berman 1998, p.179)
"... the world is blind will; [and] therefore atheism is true." (Berman 1998, p.181)
These answers are too simple. Schopenhauer's teaching rules out the three major Western religions, but there are other teachings that acknowledge something that in important ways can be seen as a god.
Magee almost seems to claim that Schopenhauer is a modern cosmological scientist malgre lui, even quoting Schršdinger to show similarities.
"We may find it hard to conceptualize energy that just is, without being generated, but given the law of the conversation of energy there is no escaping the fact that the energy which imbues the universe as a whole must be of this kind. What Schopenhauer is saying is that this energy is itself what is ultimate in the world of phenomena. (It was not until the twentieth century that the science of physics reached the same conclusion.)" (Magee 1997, p.138f; see also p.386)
But in as much as Schopenhauer is a scientist, to that extent he is no theologian, and (given the rest of his teaching), arguably an atheist. From a scientific perspective, Schopenhauer's views of energy have no foundation in previous scientific research and are lucky, albeit insightful, guesses, as was Democritus' 'discovery' of the atom. Indeed, Schopenhauer was dismissive of attempts to consider him a scientist:
"We are as little permitted to appeal to the objectification of the will, instead of giving a physical explanation, as to appeal to the creative power of God. For physics demands causes, but the will is never a cause." (Schopenhauer, vol.1, p.140; see also p.123f.)
Science is governed by the principle of sufficient reason; Wille is not. Simmel (1907, p.42) put it concisely:
"One would be unjust to this metaphysical interpretation, which is typical of and basic to the entire work of Schopenhauer, if one saw in it only an illegitimate competition of speculation with a scientific-causal interpretation of things. ... Science explains the laws of individual correlations, but not the fact that the elements of this world form a unity and follow laws."
[Additional citations for Appendix A: Schopenhauer, vol.1, p. 98f; vol.2, p.100; Janaway 1999d; Magee 1997, p.386]
Appendix B. The dynamism of Wille
Of Brahm's three aspects or emanations, Brahma, Vishnu, and Shiva (creator, preserver, destroyer), Wille resembles Vishnu in that the world requires Wille for its continued existence from moment to moment.
"[Brahma] obviously represents the generation, the origin, of beings just as Vishnu does their acme, and Shiva their destruction and extinction." [Nicholls 1999, quoting Schopenhauer, Vol.1, p.62; and Z 7,75]
"... his doctrine that the will as thing-in-itself is the sustainer of the world." (Nicholls 1999)
Studies of Schopenhauer have not focused on each of the three Hindu emanations, but there is much of interest here. First of all, there is no role for Brahma. Since time pertains only to the phenomenal world, and Wille to the noumenal world, Wille cannot exist in time, and there cannot have been a time when Wille was not.
Vishnu symbolically embodies the dynamism of the world; the 'striving' of Wille, why Wille is not itself sunk in quiet resignation.
"For in everything in nature there is something to which no ground can ever be assigned, for which no explanation is possible, and no further cause is to be sought. This something is the specific mode of the thing's action [emphasis supplied], in other words, the very manner of its existence, its being or true essence." (Schopenhauer, Vol.1, p.123f)
What does Wille ultimately strive for? Schopenhauer's answers were various, including 'nothing', but 'self-extinction' occurs as a common theme. For this, Wille needs the aspect of Shiva; but just as Wille cannot have been created, Wille cannot be destroyed, because this would have to occur in time. The "will's willing", therefore,
"provides Schopenhauer with the explanation for all dynamism in the phenomenal world." (Higgins 1998, p.153)
Wille is a god that would end its existential agony, but by its nature cannot.
[Additional citations for Appendix B: Schopenhauer vol. 1, p.152; Atwell 1995, p.31; Simmel 1907, p.51f.]
A. References to Schopenhauer's Philosophy
(Atwell 1995) Atwell, John E. Schopenhauer on the Character of the World: The Metaphysics of Will. University of California Press, 1995.
(Berman 1995) Berman, David. 'Introduction' to Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Idea. Everyman, 1995.
(Berman 1998) Berman, David. "Schopenhauer and Nietzsche: Honest Atheism, Dishonest Pessimism". Pages 178-195 in Janaway (1998)
(Gardner 1999) Gardner, Sebastian. "Schopenhauer, Will, and the Unconscious". Pages 375-421 in Janaway (1999a).
(Gillespie 1995) Gillespie, Michael Allen. Nihilism Before Nietzsche. University of Chicago Press, 1995.
(Higgins 1998) Higgins, Kathleen Marie. "Schopenhauer and Nietzsche: Temperament and Temporality". Pages 151-177 in Janaway (1998).
(Janaway 1994) Janaway, Christopher. Schopenhauer. Oxford University Press, 1994.
(Janaway 1998) Janaway, Christopher, ed.. Willing and Nothingness: Schopenhauer as Nietzsche's Educator. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998.
(Janaway 1999a) Janaway, Christopher, ed.. The Cambridge Companion to Schopenhauer. Cambridge University Press, 1999.
(Janaway 1999b) Janaway, Christopher. "Will and Nature". Pages 138-170 in Janaway (1999a).
(Janaway 1999c) Janaway, Christopher. "Introduction". Pages 1-17 in Janaway (1999a).
(Janaway 1999d) Janaway, Christopher. "Schopenhauer's Pessimism". Pages 318-343 in Janaway (1999a).
(Loiskandl et al 1986) Loiskandl, Helmut; Weinstein, Deena; and Weinstein, Michael. "Introduction", pages xi-lii in Simmel.
(Magee 1997) Magee, Brian. The Philosophy of Schopenhauer, Revised and Enlarged Edition. 1997
(Magee 1998) Magee, Brian. Confessions of a Philosopher. Random House, 1998.
(Nicholls 1999) Nicholls, Moira. "Influences of Eastern Thought". Pages 171-212 in Janaway (1999a).
(Nussbaum 1999) Nussbaum, Martha C. "Nietzsche, Schopenhauer, and Dionysus". Pages 344-374 in Janaway (1999a).
(Schopenhauer 1819-1859) Schopenhauer, Arthur. The World as Will and Representation, translated from the German by E.F.J. Payne [from the third edition of 1859]. New York: Dover, 1966.
(Simmel 1907) Simmel, Georg. Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, trans. Helmut Loiskandl, Deena Weinstein, and Michael Weinstein. University of Illinois Press, 1986.
B. References to the Nature of God and Theology
(Creel 1997) Creel, Richard E. "Immutability and Impassibility". Pages 313-319 in Quinn & Taliaferro.
(Helm 1997) Helm, Paul. "Goodness". Pages 243-249 in Quinn & Taliaferro.
(Hoffman & Rosenkrantz 1997) Hoffman, Joshua, and Rosenkrantz, Gary. "Omnipotence". Pages 229-235 in Quinn & Taliaferro.
(Leftow 1997) Leftow, Brian. "Eternity". Pages 257-263 in Quinn & Taliaferro.
(Mann 1997) Mann, William E. "Necessity". Pages 264-270 in Quinn & Taliaferro.
(Mavrodes 1997) Mavrodes, George I. "Omniscience". Pages 236-242 in Quinn & Taliaferro.
(McCann 1997) McCann, Hugh J. "Creation and Conservation". Pages 306-312 in Quinn & Taliaferro.
(Quinn & Taliaferro 1997) Quinn, Philip L., and Taliaferro, Charles. A Companion to Philosophy of Religion. Blackwell, 1997.
(Sherry 1997) Sherry, Patrick. "Beauty". Pages 279-285 in Quinn & Taliaferro.
(Stump 1997) Stump, Eleanore. "Simplicity". Pages 250-256 in Quinn & Taliaferro.
(Taliaferro 1997) Taliaferro, Charles. "Incorporeality". Pages 271-278 in Quinn & Taliaferro.
(Tracy 1997) Tracy, Thomas F. "Divine Action". Pages 299-305 in Quinn & Taliaferro.
(Wierenga 1997) Wierenga, Edward R. "Omnipresence". Pages 286-290 in Quinn & Taliaferro.
(Williams 1997) Williams, C.J.F. "Being". Pages 223-228 in Quinn & Taliaferro.
(Zagzebski 1997) Zagzebski, Linda. "Foreknowledge and Human Freedom". Pages 291-298 in Quinn & Taliaferro.
C. Other References
(Bouzereau 1997) Bouzereau, Laurent. Star Wars, The Annotated Screenplays. Ballantine, 1997.
(Nagel 1986) Nagel, Thomas. The View from Nowhere. Oxford University Press, 1986.