EDITOR’S NOTE

by Nicholas Anakwue

This month’s issue of Philosophy Pathways discusses metaphysical themes that run through the intersection between identity, knowledge and phenomenology. As Kant’s Copernican revolution had affirmed, the trajectory of knowledge was to progress from the categories of the mind to the world out there. The affirmation of identity was a primary substantive factor in the development and maturity of the self and knowledge.

As such, our first essayist, Tam Sar, in Evaluating Classical Identity and Its Alternatives evaluates the classical concept of identity and aligns it with its other alternatives. He first outlines the basic principles of identity as being held necessarily and permanently, and then, establishing that there is always a determinate fact of identity and finally, that identity is absolute. His discussion takes us through the comparison of identity with Leibniz’s congruence, while endeavoring to distinguish identity from congruence, in spite of their common ground of indiscernibility.

Sanjit Chakraborty, in Wittgenstein and Husserl: Context meaning Theory takes us through a critical analysis of Wittgenstein’s picture theory of meaning, and the evolution of Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language, from reference to meaning. He attempts to make a needed comparison between Wittgenstein’s preoccupation with essence and meaning, and Edmund Husserl’s theory of intentionality. For both philosophers, language is important in understanding the entire gamut of existence and perception. While Husserl takes a phenomenological stance, Wittgenstein instead adopts an ordinary language hypothesis of meaning and essence.

In my article on An Appraisal of Hume’s Hermeneutics of the A Priori, I critiqued Hume’s academic submission of the a priori as an unfounded basis for knowledge. Hume had affirmed that a priori truths were vacuous and empty and not suitable to ground knowledge. Hume’s position is however, dismissive of the fact that while experience affords us epistemological access to objects of knowledge, these objects of knowledge exist in themselves, possessing a distinct ontological status. Kant makes the needed intervention that, through the synthetic a priori we can arrive of verifiable truths describing the conditions for the possibility of experience.

Martin Jenkins, finally, elaborates in Ich Fichte: Absolutely on Kant’s Copernican revolution as enthroning the ‘I’ at the center of the enquiry of knowledge. The ‘I’ becomes not just a Cartesian subject, as Descartes’ idealism had recommended, but so much more as a dynamic process and activity with the ‘Not-I’. The ‘I’ also finds its meaning and relevance only as a part of the larger
absolute ‘I’ which sustains it and everything. Fichte tries to identify this absolute ‘I’ in which all other things find meaning as God.

These essays are both interesting and elaborative, and express the vast interconnectivity of the facets of philosophy – metaphysics, epistemology, logic and axiology. Through a thorough understanding of these different aspects of the self, identity and knowledge, through the lens of the masters and progenitors of philosophy, a deeper awareness and understanding of our contemporary Weltanshauung is gleaned.

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