According to the ethics of dialogue, how is it possible for moral judgements to be true? What does your answer to that question show about the nature of truth?

How can anything be true? If and only if a target or goal is achieved or matched up with, that is what we as agents and not just experiencers are aiming at. As agents we have a wish no a stronger term is required, a necessary requirement for truth, because agents are logically more successful in the world when the truth conditions of their beliefs are realised (Hartry Field). If my beliefs are false then the actions that I take on that fragile basis will have the consequence of failure or error. I need my beliefs to be true because I rely on them for amongst other things inference.

Let us say that I believe I have a coherent set of beliefs and I know that from my own case, but in the course of action and retrospective reviews of my actions I sometimes feel guilt and I fail to listen to another's feedback on who some actions of mine have impacted. That is a world that is my world alone and although I may or may not achieve success in that world that is undoubtedly my *internalist* reality. I can have guilt about certain thoughts that I might have from time to time and these warn me that I might be wrong, but it is action that brings them out into the open for others to witness, the same can be said about any amount of self-deceit I might have and although such evidence may be hidden from me because it sits below my radar it is again betrayed by any action. If I ignore the incoming data In short I am only aiming at what I believe to be truth unplugged from any objective reality.

Now, I decide to listen to others, I talk about my feelings of guilt (and what else I believe to be true on certain subject matters) and it may be that as a result of dialogue it was not right that I did what I did (in that case it was a falsehood or error that had occurred) or actually it was a perfectly reasonable thing to do (then it was true) either way I now have the potential at *aiming* at objective correctness and at least I can modify my beliefs and desires accordingly and if necessary and if indeed I choose to do so. What I have come to accept is that my map of the world, although it is a reality in its own right (Nietzsche, placing himself beyond truth and falsehood; there would be no life at all were it not on the basis of perspective valuations and sembances) is not the only reality that exists and to pace Hume, we must take that for granted in all of our reasoning's.

If we accept that here are no `moral facts' embedded in the fabric of the world that we can have direct acquaintance with, there are however still facts that are available to describe states of affairs. So if we take facts to be evidence or information about *such and such*, we can use that data as the basis for a discussion and that is what we do. In judgement there is something that exists in some way and that something can be characterised again in some way. The process of establishing finding and discovering the truth is uncontroversial to say proven via dialogue, investigation, experiment and this applies to both moral and none moral truths.

For example, If I have been out the whole day playing golf and drinking with my pals whilst my wife has been at home alone looking after the baby, those are the facts as they stand. Now when I get home and my wife is not happy and wants to talk. "Do you think that is right that you should stay out all day, when, you*promised* to come home as soon as you had finished the golf?" Now, there is some additional information out in the open to what had previously been disclosed, whatever I say, unless I had called her (which I obviously didn't on this occasion) to inform her as to a change of plans and to discuss if that was an acceptable or viable thing to do in the circumstances, it is morally true that I should have come home as previously arranged. You can dress that up in whatever words you wish, but, the target had been set and that is what I morally should have been aiming at. If I am to continue in this way it is unlikely I will achieve any success, certainly not in my marriage anyway.

A sharper example can be given in a business context, I have a sales target of £1 million, I am aware of it, it is not a random figure, there is a general business plan of which that is factor it is not a secret it is out in the open.

If I hit my target I have achieved my aim, that is true, if I don't I have failed. If due to adverse trading conditions the target is revised (say down to £900K) and so accordingly is the business plan, if I hit my numbers I have still achieved the goal, that is truth, that is a successful agent who achieves their aims via an ever developing set of beliefs and desires, appropriate actions that correspond to the facts that are out there to be discovered.

As ordinary language users we can share beliefs about our portions of the world and those beliefs interconnected with our desires lead to actions. Truth consists in a convergence on a single result, moral judgements as statements owe their truth to the nature of the world as it is in a certain way, so truth does in some sense correspond to the facts as *we* take them to be. The same can be said of none moral judgements. This makes truth more of an empirical notion rather than anything deep, complex, naturalistic and metaphysically mystical.

What we have demonstrated is that at the level of dialogue truth as a concept does not have a mysterious status (Horwich, Truth, pg 1; a misconception that truth has some hidden structure awaiting our discovery), but is a predicate that implies something objective (that serves a logical need, but not to be attributed as a property). Generalisations about truth are not really about truth, they belong to a class of schematic generalisations that rely on the equivalence schema for their formulation (Horwich, ibid, pg 141). The equivalence schema It is true *that p* if and only if *p,* is underpinned by propositions being the bearers of truth, that they are formulated using ordinary language and follow the principle of beliefs and desires that dictate our actions gives the notion a common sense perspective. Hence the proposition (<p>)`snow is white' is true iff <p>.

It is important that a proposition is true because an awful lot could hang on that being the case for someone's life. So although a minimalist theory may be seen as treating truth as insubstantial, as it is tied to crucial actions out in the world I don't see that as being so, truth is meaningful it is just that truth in itself has no underlying nature.

I haven't mentioned anything about facts that aren't actually facts because they are potentially undecidable, unknowable (verifiable, discoverable) in other words something that is metaphysically and epistemologically problematic. This is because in an ethics of dialogue at the surface structure of language if I am talking rubbish being morally inconsiderate or pretending to be a mind reader I will be brought quickly back to earth with a bump by my interlocutor either that or I will miss the target by a mile and that will affect my success in the world. (<p>) is true iff *p*.